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Abstract. This paper investigates a cognitive radio network where a secondary sender assists a
primary transmitter in relaying primary information to a primary receiver and also transmits its
own information to a secondary recipient. This sender is capable of jamming to protect secondary
and/or primary information against an eavesdropper and self-powering by harvesting radio frequency
energy of primary signals. Security capability of both secondary and primary networks are analyzed
in terms of secrecy outage probability. Numerous results corroborate the proposed analysis which
serves as a design guideline to quickly assess and optimize security performance. More importantly,
security capability trade-off between secondary and primary networks can be totally controlled with
appropriate selection of system parameters.
Keywords. Jamming; Self-powering; Cognitive radios; Security.
1. INTRODUCTION
Next generation mobile networks provide a wide range of emerging services and hence,
require modern technologies with better spectrum utilization efficiency, energy efficiency,
and information security [1]. Spectrum utilization efficiency can be improved with cognitive
radio technology which allows secondary users (SUs) to transmit their information in licensed
spectrum of primary users (PUs) without corrupting received signals of PUs. Three typical
operation mechanisms of SUs are underlay, overlay, and interweave [2]. In the underlay and
overlay mechanisms, SUs and PUs operate concurrently but the former limits SUs’ transmit
power for tolerable interference at PUs while the latter applies advanced signal processing
methods to remain or enhance performance of PUs. Meanwhile, the interweave mechanism
merely permits SUs to utilize unoccupied spectrum of PUs.
Many feasible solutions such as hardware solutions [3], harvesting energy from available
sources (e.g., solar, radio frequency (RF) powers, thermal, wind, ...) [4], network planning [5]
can improve energy efficiency. Among these solutions, RF energy harvesting neither demands
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additional energy scavenging equipments (e.g., wind turbines, solar panels) nor depends time-
variant energy resources. Accordingly, it is considered in standards of next generation mobile
networks which implement it through simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) [6–8] or relaying transmission [9–11].
SUs with self-powering capability by harvesting RF energy contribute higher (energy
and spectrum utilization) efficiencies to design of next generation mobile networks thanks to
exploiting benefits of both cognitive radio and RF energy harvesting technologies. However,
the cognitive radio technology also offers an open access environment and hence, eavesdrop-
pers can emulate legal users (SUs and/or PUs) to wire-tap secret information, causing a
serious security problem. Currently, beside conventional cryptographic and encryption so-
lutions, physical layer security (PLS), which takes advantages of wireless channel variations
to secure secret information, has attracted research community lately [12]. Many viable
methods for implementing PLS can be listed as transmit beam-forming [13], on-off trans-
mission [14], jamming [15], transmit antenna selection [16], opportunistic scheduling [17],
and relaying [18]. Among them, jamming is simple, flexible, and efficient for implemen-
tation [19]. Accordingly, cognitive radio networks with SUs capable of self-powering and
jamming are investigated in this paper, which can achieve simultaneously better spectrum
utilization efficiency, energy efficiency and information security.
1.1. Literature review
This paper investigates cognitive radio networks with SUs capable of self-powering and
jamming where SUs operate in the overlay mechanism and assist primary transmitters in
relaying primary information to primary receivers and also transmit their own information
to secondary recipients. SUs’ transmission is wire-tapped by eavesdroppers.
Whilst most works have focused on security solutions for cognitive radio networks with
SUs capable of harvesting RF energy and operating in the interweave and underlay mecha-
nisms, few publications have studied the overlay mechanism lately [20–24]. More specifically,
the almost identical system model as ours was investigated in [20] and [21] but their security
solution is to jam the eavesdropper by primary receiver1. The authors in [22] deployed a
dedicated jammer to interrupt the signal reception of the eavesdropper instead of the pri-
mary receiver as in [20] and [21]. To further secure primary network, [23] exploited both the
dedicated jammer and the primary receiver to jam the eavesdropper. Nonetheless, [20–23]
did not carry out the security analysis in terms of secrecy outage probability (SOP). As
alternative security solutions, [24] proposed multi-user scheduling and transmit antenna se-
lection and analyzed the ergodic rate of secondary network and the SOP of primary network.
Nevertheless, different from [20–23], the authors in [24] required SUs to relay primary infor-
mation and send their own information independently in order to simplify the SOP analysis
and make it tractable.
1The system model in [20] and [21] is the same as that in [25]. Nevertheless, [25] assumed energy harvested
from the ambient (e.g., wind, solar) other than RF signals, significantly simplifying the analysis. Moreover, [25]
did not exploit the jamming technique. Therefore, references like [25] should not be reviewed.
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1.2. Contributions
Although the ergodic rate of secondary network and the SOP of primary network was
analyzed in [24], SUs are required to relay primary information and send their own infor-
mation separately. This demands at least three stages (Stage 1: Primary transmission and
energy harvesting; Stage 2: Secondary transmission to PU; Stage 3: Secondary transmission
to SU) to finish a transmission process of both SU and PU, dramatically mitigating spectral
efficiency. This paper improves spectral efficiency and security capability of [24] by proposing
a two-stage transmission scheme with SU capable of jamming. Here are our contributions:
• Propose a novel operation principle of secondary sender that can do multiple tasks
simultaneously: i) harvest RF energy from the primary transmitter; ii) decode primary
information; iii) network-code three (secondary, primary, jamming) information. This
principle is flexibly controlled by various parameters whose appropriate selection can
obtain desired security trade-off between primary and secondary networks as well as
optimize system performance.
• Propose exact SOP expressions for quickly assessing security capability of both primary
and secondary networks without time-consuming simulations.
• Provide optimum parameter sets for maximum security capability and expected per-
formance trade-off between primary and secondary networks.
• Illustrate key results on security capability of primary/secondary network with respect
to numerous system parameters.
1.3. Structure
The system model is described in next part which is followed by the derivation of the
SOPs of both secondary and primary networks in Part 3. Then, Part 4 demonstrates results
while Part 5 concludes the paper.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 1 illustrates a cognitive radio network with a secondary sender S capable of self-
powering by harvesting RF energy from signals of a primary transmitter T and jamming
an eavesdropper E to secure information transmission of both S and T . S operates in
the overlay mechanism and hence, it not only relays primary signal to a primary receiver R
(assuming that T and R cannot communicate directly to each other due to heavy shadowing,
long distance,...) but also transmits its own signal to a secondary recipient D.
In Figure 1, channel coefficients between T and S, S and D, S and E, S and R are
correspondingly denoted as gts, gsd, gse, gsr. This paper assumes Rayleigh fading channels
and hence, they are respectively modelled as gts ∼ CN (0, ϑts), gsd ∼ CN (0, ϑsd), gse ∼
CN (0, ϑse), and gsr ∼ CN (0, ϑsr). Then, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and
the probability density function (PDF) of the channel gain hmn = |gmn|2 are respectively
addressed as Fhmn (x) = 1 − e−x/ϑmn and fhmn (x) = e−x/ϑmn/ϑmn, where x ≥ 0, m ∈ {t, s} and
n ∈ {s, r, d, e}.
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Figure 1. System model
In Figure 1, a complete primary and secondary transmission lasts two stages with total
time of B. The stage 1, which remains βB with β ∈ (0, 1) being the time allocation factor, is
for T to perform SWIPT such that S harvests RF energy from primary signals relied on the
power splitting technique [26] and recovers primary information. S firstly partitions its recei-
ved signal into two parts: One part
√
γbs (bs is the received signal of S and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the
power allocation factor) for recovering primary information2 and the other part
√
1− γbs for
harvesting RF energy; Secondly, based on the decoding result, signal generator of S produces
different signal combinations. More specifically, if S correctly restores primary information,
it sends a network-coded signal consisting of three (primary, secondary, jamming) informa-
tion. Otherwise, it transmits a network-coded signal comprising of two (secondary, jamming)
information. In the stage 2 which remains (1− β)B, S broadcasts the network-coded signal
to R, D, and E.
The signal which S receives in the stage 1 is
bs = gts
√
Ptat + is, (1)
where Pt is the transmit power of T , at is the transmit symbol of the unit power, is ∼
CN (0, κs) is the noise produced by the receiving antenna at S.
2The current paper assumes that information decoder consumes negligible energy. This assumption is
mostly acknowledged in the literature (e.g., [27–33]).
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Relied on Figure 1, the total energy which S harvests in the stage 1 is
Es = λE
{
|√γbs|2
}
βB = βλγ (Pthts + κs)B, (2)
where E{·} is the statistical average and λ ∈ (0, 1) is the energy conversion efficiency.
The power which S can utilize in the stage 2 is
Ps =
Es
(1− β)B =
βλγ
1− β (Pthts + κs) . (3)
Figure 1 exposes the signal for recovering primary information as
bˆs =
√
1− γbs + iˆs, (4)
where iˆs ∼ CN (0, κˆs) is the noise induced by the passband-to-baseband signal conversion.
Substituting (1) into (4), one has
bˆs =
√
(1− γ)Ptgtsat +
√
1− γis + iˆs, (5)
from which the SNR achievable for recovering primary information is
Γs =
E
{∣∣∣√(1− γ)Ptgtsat∣∣∣2}
E
{∣∣∣√1− γis + iˆs∣∣∣2} = Ahts, (6)
where
A =
(1− γ)Pt
(1− γ)κs + κˆs . (7)
S can achieve the channel capacity as Cs = βlog2 (1 + Γs) bps/Hz where the constant
β before the logarithm is because the stage 1 remains βB. According to the information
theory, S precisely recovers primary information merely if Cs is above the target spectral
efficiency Ct, i.e., Cs ≥ Ct. In other words, at is precisely recovered at S if Γs ≥ Γt, where
Γt = 2
Ct/β − 1.
The signal generator of S outputs the network-coded signal dependent on the decoding
result. If S correctly restores primary information, it transmits a superposition of three
signals in the form of
√
εζPsat +
√
ε (1− ζ)Psas +
√
(1− ε)Psaj in the stage 2, where ε is
the power splitting factor for legitimate signals and jamming signal when S correctly restores
primary information, ζ is the power splitting factor for secondary and primary signals, as is
the privacy symbol of the unit power of S, and aj is the jamming symbol of the unit power.
Otherwise, it sends a superposition of only two signals in the form of
√
µPsas +
√
(1− µ)Psaj
in the stage 2, where µ is the power splitting factor for legitimate and jamming signals when
S decodes unsuccessfully primary information. Accordingly, K ∈ {R,D,E} receive the
following signal in the stage 2
bk =
 gsk
(√
εζPsat +
√
ε (1− ζ)Psas +
√
(1− ε)Psaj
)
+ ik, Γs ≥ Γt
gsk
(√
µPsas +
√
(1− µ)Psaj
)
+ ik, Γs < Γt,
(8)
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where ik ∼ CN (0, κk) is the noise caused by the receive antenna at K.
The jamming signal aj is intentionally generated by S to solely interrupt signal reception
of E without mitigating the performance of the legal receiver L ∈ {R,D}. This can be
implemented by letting S to share aj with L (e.g., the seed of the jamming signal generator
at S is shared with L in a secure manner through a cooperation hand-shaking solely among
S and L before information transmission starts). Such a jamming signal generation is widely
accepted in most existing works (e.g., [34–43]). Accordingly, the legal receiver L can exactly
re-generate the jamming signal and completely take it out of its received signal, intimately
obtaining the jamming-free signal at L as
bˆl =
{
gsl
(√
εζPsat +
√
ε (1− ζ)Psas
)
+ il, Γs ≥ Γt
gsl
√
µPsas + il, Γs < Γt
(9)
from which SINRs for decoding at at R and as at D are correspondingly expressed as
Γr =

εζPshsr
ε (1− ζ)Pshsr + κr , Γs ≥ Γt
0, Γs < Γt,
(10)
Γd =

ε (1− ζ)Pshsd
εζPshsd + κd
, Γs ≥ Γt
µPshsd
κd
, Γs < Γt.
(11)
It is recalled that the jamming signal aj is solely shared among S, R, and D for securing
as and at but unknown at E. Accordingly, the SINRs at E for decoding at and as are inferred
from (8), correspondingly, as
ΓEt =

εζPshse
(1− εζ)Pshse + κe , Γs ≥ Γt
0, Γs < Γt,
(12)
ΓEs =

ε (1− ζ)Pshse
(εζ + 1− ε)Pshse + κe , Γs ≥ Γt
µPshse
(1− µ)Pshse + κe , Γs < Γt.
(13)
It is remarked from (12) and (13) that ΓEt and ΓEs are inversely proportional to the
jamming signal power which can be flexibly controlled by ε, ζ, µ. Accordingly, increasing
the amount of the jamming signal improves security performance for as and at.
R andD achieve correspondingly the channel capacities in the stage 2 which are computed
from (10) and (11)
Cr = (1− β) log2 (1 + Γr) , (14)
Cd = (1− β) log2 (1 + Γd) , (15)
where 1− β before the logarithm is because the stage 2 remains (1− β)B.
Similarly, E achieves the channel capacities for decoding at and as in the stage 2 which
are computed from (12) and (13), correspondingly
CEt = (1− β) log2 (1 + ΓEt) , (16)
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CEs = (1− β) log2 (1 + ΓEs) . (17)
The secrecy capacity for as is the gap between the capacities at D and E for recovering
as, i.e.,
C˜s = [Cd − CEs]+ = (1− β)
[
log2
1 + Γd
1 + ΓEs
]+
, (18)
where [x]+ stands for max (x, 0).
Similarly, the secrecy capacity for at is the gap between the capacities at R and E for
recovering at, i.e.,
C˜t = (1− β)
[
log2
1 + Γr
1 + ΓEt
]+
. (19)
3. SECURITY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section suggests accurate SOP expressions for promptly assessing security perfor-
mance for as and at without exhaustive simulations. The SOP is the possibility that the
secrecy capacity is below the predetermined security level C0. Accordingly, the SOP is an
essential metric to evaluate the security capability of both primary and secondary networks.
3.1. Primary SOP
The primary SOP measures the security performance for protecting at, which is addressed
as
SOPp = Pr
{
C˜t < C0
}
. (20)
Because C˜t takes two values dependent on whether S correctly recovers primary infor-
mation or not, SOPp must be decomposed into two cases as
SOPp = Pr
{
C˜t < C0, Cs ≥ Ct
}
+ Pr
{
C˜t < C0, Cs < Ct
}
. (21)
According to the operation principle of the signal generator at S, if S correctly recovers
primary information, it does not relay primary information and hence, the SINR at R for
decoding at is zero (i.e., Γr = 0 for Γs < Γt as seen in (10)). Accordingly, this case induces
zero secrecy capacity for at (i.e., C˜t = 0 conditioned on Γs < Γt) and hence, the event
C˜t < C0 always happens. Therefore, (21) is further simplified as
SOPp = E|Γs≥Γt
Pr
{
C˜t < C0
∣∣∣Γs ≥ Γt}︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
+ Pr {Γs < Γt} , (22)
where E|Z denotes the conditional expectation on Z.
Invoking C˜t in (19), one obtains
∆ = Pr {1 + Γr < U (1 + ΓEt)|Γs ≥ Γt} , (23)
where
U = 2C0/(1−β). (24)
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Invoking (10) and (12) for the case of Γs ≥ Γt, ∆ in (23) is rewritten as
∆ = Pr {Xsr < UXse|Γs ≥ Γt} , (25)
where
Xsr = 1 +
Dhsr
Gsrhsr + κr
, (26)
Xse = 1 +
Dhse
Gsehse + κe
, (27)
with
D = εζPs, (28)
Gsr = ε (1− ζ)Ps, (29)
Gse = (1− εζ)Ps. (30)
Before solving (25) in closed-form, some preliminary results are prepared in the following
lemmas.
Lemma 1. The PDFs of Xsr and Xse are correspondingly expressed as
fXsr (x) =
Msr
(x−Ksr)2
eHsr
x−1
x−Ksr , 1 ≤ x < Ksr (31)
and
fXse (y) =
Mse
(y −Kse)2
e
Hse
y−1
y−Kse , 1 ≤ y < Kse (32)
where
Ksr = D/Gsr + 1, (33)
Hsr = κr/ (ϑsrGsr) , (34)
Msr = HsrD/Gsr, (35)
Kse = D/Gse + 1, (36)
Hse = κe/ (ϑseGse) , (37)
Mse = HseD/Gse. (38)
Proof. Using (26), one infers
hsr =
(Xsr − 1)κr
D +Gsr −GsrXsr . (39)
Because hsr ≥ 0, Xsr is constrained by 1 ≤ Xsr < DGsr + 1. The Jacobian coefficient is
computed as
dhsr
dXsr
=
Dκr
(D +Gsr −GsrXsr)2
. (40)
Given the variable substitution in (26), the PDF of Xsr can be inferred from the PDF of
hsr as
fXsr (x) = fhsr
(
(x− 1)κr
D +Gsr −Gsrx
) ∣∣∣∣ dhsrdXsr
∣∣∣∣
Xsr=x
. (41)
SECURITY CAPABILITY ANALYSIS OF COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORK 213
Inserting fhsr (x) = e
−x/ϑsr/ϑsr and the Jacobian coefficient into (41), the PDF of Xsr
is obtained as (31). By following the proof of (31), the PDF of Xse can be inferred as (32).
This finishes the proof. 
Lemma 2. The exact closed-form representation of
A (a, b, Lsr) =
b∫
a
fXsr (x) dx, (42)
is
A (a, b, Lsr) = eHsr
(
e
Msr
a−Ksr − e Msrb−Ksr
)
(43)
where Lsr = {Hsr,Msr,Ksr} is the set of parameters relating the transmission from S to R,
1 ≤ a < b ≤ Ksr.
Proof. Plugging fXsr (x) in (31) into (42) and performing the variable changes, one obtains
A (a, b, Lsr) =
b∫
a
Msr
(x−Ksr)2
eHsr
x−1
x−Ksr dx
y= 1
x−Ksr= −Msr
1
b−Ksr∫
1
a−Ksr
e
Hsry
(
1
y
+Ksr−1
)
dy
= eHsr
1
a−Ksr∫
1
b−Ksr
Msre
Msrydy. (44)
The last integral is straightforwardly computed, reducing (44) to (43). This finishes the
proof. 
The preliminary results in two above lemmas are convenient to represent ∆ in (25) in a
compact form as follows.
Theorem 1. ∆ is expressed in an exact closed form as
∆ =

1−MseeHsr+HseG, Kse < V
1−MseeHsr+HseK, 1 ≤ V < Kse
1, V < 1
(45)
where
V = Ksr/U, (46)
J = Msr/U, (47)
I = (Kse − 1)−1 − (Kse − V )−1, (48)
214 NGOC PHAM-THI-DAN, et al.
G = e JKse−V
{
e−Hse
Mse
− J
(Kse − V )2
e
Mse
V−KseEi (−MseI)
+
∞∑
n=2
Jn(−Mse)n−1
n! (n− 1)!(Kse − V )2n
[
e−Hse
n−1∑
k=1
(k − 1)!
(−MseI)k
− e MseV−KseEi (−MseI)
]}
,
(49)
K = e J−MseKse−V
{
e−MseI − 1
Mse
+
∞∑
n=1
Jn
(Kse − V )2nn!
×e−MseI
n−1∑
k=1
(−Mse)k−1
In−k
k∏
i=1
(n− i)
− (−Mse)
n−1
(n− 1)! Ei (−MseI)

 ,
(50)
with Ei (·) being the exponential-integral function [44].
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A. 
For convenience of presentation, let ∆¯ = 1−∆. Then
∆¯ =

Msee
Hsr+HseG, Kse < V
Msee
Hsr+HseK, 1 ≤ V < Kse
0, V < 1.
(51)
Plugging ∆ in (45) into (22) results in
SOPp = E|Γs≥Γt
{
1− ∆¯}+ Pr {Γs < Γt}
= E|Γs≥Γt {1}+ Pr {Γs < Γt} − E|Γs≥Γt
{
∆¯
}
= Pr {Γs ≥ Γt}+ Pr {Γs < Γt} − E|Γs≥Γt
{
∆¯
}
= 1− E|Γs≥Γt
{
∆¯
}
.
(52)
Because ∆¯ is a function of a random variable Ps (or hts = x) according to (3) and
the condition Γs ≥ Γt is equivalent to hts ≥ Γt/A, (52) can be expressed in terms of a
single-variable integral as
SOPp = 1−
∞∫
Γt/A
∆¯fhts (x) dx
=

1− 1ϑts
∞∫
Γt/A
Msee
Hsr+Hse−x/ϑtsGdx, Kse < V
1− 1ϑts
∞∫
Γt/A
Msee
Hsr+Hse−x/ϑtsKdx, 1 ≤ V < Kse
1, V < 1.
(53)
3.2. Secondary SOP
The secondary SOP measures the security performance for protecting as, which is ad-
dressed as
SOPs = Pr
{
C˜s < C0
}
. (54)
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Because C˜s takes two values dependent on whether S correctly recovers primary infor-
mation or not, SOPs must be decomposed into two cases as
SOPs = Pr
{
C˜s < C0, Cs ≥ Ct
}
+ Pr
{
C˜s < C0, Cs < Ct
}
. (55)
Inserting C˜s in (18) into (55), one obtains
SOPs = E|Γs≥Γt

Ψ1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr {1 + Γd < U (1 + ΓEs)|Γs ≥ Γt}

+ E|Γs<Γt
Pr {1 + Γd < U (1 + ΓEs)|Γs < Γt}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ2
 .
(56)
The explicit form of Ψ1 in (56) is obtained after invoking (11) and (13) for the case of
Γs ≥ Γt as
Ψ1 = Pr
{
1 +
ε (1− ζ)Pshsd
εζPshsd + κd
< U
(
1 +
ε (1− ζ)Pshse
(εζ + 1− ε)Pshse + κe
)∣∣∣∣Γs ≥ Γt} . (57)
By observing (25) and (57), it is seen that Ψ1 and ∆ have a same form. Accordingly,
with appropriate variable substitutions in ∆ in (25), one can obtain the exact closed-form
expression of Ψ1. To be more specific, Ψ1 is achieved from ∆ in (45) with ε (1− ζ)Ps → D,
εζPs → Gsr, (εζ + 1− ε)Ps → Gse, ϑsd → ϑsr, κd → κr. Accordingly, the derivation of Ψ1
is omitted here for briefness
Ψ1 = 1− ∆¯ε(1−ζ)Ps→D,εζPs→Gsr,(εζ+1−ε)Ps→Gse,ϑsd→ϑsr,κd→κr . (58)
Ψ2 in (56) is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Ψ2 is derived in an exact closed form as
Ψ2 = 1− H¯
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
(
Q¯G¯√
E¯
)n
e−E¯/2W−n
2
, 1−n
2
(
E¯
)
, (59)
where
A¯ = µPs/κd, (60)
B¯ = µPs, (61)
C¯ = (1− µ)Ps, (62)
D¯ = 1 + B¯/C¯, (63)
E¯ = κe/
(
ϑseC¯
)
, (64)
G¯ = E¯B¯/C¯, (65)
Q¯ = U/
(
ϑsdA¯
)
, (66)
H¯ = eE¯−Q¯D¯+(ϑsdA¯)
−1
, (67)
with Wa,b (c) being the Whittaker function [44, eq. (1087.4)].
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Proof. Please refer to Appendix B. 
Inserting Ψ1 in (58) and Ψ2 in (59) into (56), one achieves
SOPs = E|Γs≥Γt
{
1− ∆¯ε(1−ζ)Ps→D,εζPs→Gsr,(εζ+1−ε)Ps→Gse,ϑsd→ϑsr,κd→κr
}
+ E|Γs<Γt
{
1− H¯
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
(
Q¯G¯√
E¯
)n
e−E¯/2W−n/2,(1−n)/2
(
E¯
)}
= 1− E|Γs≥Γt
{
∆¯ε(1−ζ)Ps→D,εζPs→Gsr,(εζ+1−ε)Ps→Gse,ϑsd→ϑsr,κd→κr
}
−
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
E|Γs<Γt
{
H¯
(
Q¯G¯√
E¯
)n
e−E¯/2W−n/2,(1−n)/2
(
E¯
)}
.
(68)
Because terms inside conditional expectations are functions of the random variable Ps
(or hts = x) and the conditions Γs ≥ Γt and Γs < Γt are correspondingly equivalent to
hts ≥ Γt/A, and hts < Γt/A, (68) can be expressed in terms of a single-variable integral as
SOPs = 1− 1
ϑts
∞∫
Γt/A
e−x/ϑts∆¯ε(1−ζ)Ps→D,εζPs→Gsr,(εζ+1−ε)Ps→Gse,ϑsd→ϑsr,κd→κrdx
− 1
ϑts
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
Γt/A∫
0
e−x/ϑts−E¯/2H¯
(
Q¯G¯√
E¯
)n
W−n/2,(1−n)/2
(
E¯
)
dx.
(69)
3.3. Remark
The exact single-variable expressions of SOPp and SOPs are numerically evaluated by
various computation softwares (e.g., Matlab, Mathematica). As such, they are helpful in
promptly assessing the security performance of both secondary and primary networks without
exhaustive simulations. Upon our understanding, these expressions have not been reported
in any publication yet.
4. ILLUSTRATIVE RESULTS
This section demonstrates the SOPs of both secondary and primary networks in key
system parameters. Taking path-loss into account, fading power of the m − n channel is
modelled as ϑmn = d
−φ
mn where dmn is the m-n distance and φ is the path-loss exponent. For
illustration purposes, some system parameters are listed as follows: coordinates of T , R, S,
D, E are (−0.1, 0.3), (0.5,−0.2), (d, 0.0), (0.6, 0.0), (0.6,−0.1), correspondingly; λ = 0.9;
κs = κe = κr = κd = κˆs = N0; φ = 4. In the following figures, “Sim.” and “Ana.”
correspondingly represent the simulated result and the analytical results in (53) and (69). A
common observation from the following figures is that the simulation matches the analysis,
confirming the validity of the proposed expressions in (53) and (69).
Figure 2 plots the SOPs with respect to (w.r.t) Pt/N0 for C0 = 0.1 bps/Hz, Ct = 0.1
bps/Hz, Pt/N0, β = 0.4, γ = 0.6, d = 0.0, ε = 0.7, ζ = 0.6, µ = 0.7. These results
show security performance improvement (i.e., SOPs decrease) with increasing Pt/N0. This is
because increasing Pt/N0 offers S more harvested energy and higher possibility of decoding
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Figure 2. SOPs w.r.t Pt/N0
successfully primary information and hence, improving the SINRs at corresponding receivers
in the stage 2 and mitigating the SOPs. Additionally, the primary network obtains higher
security performance than the secondary network. This comes from the fact that the power
splitting factor for primary and secondary signals is ζ = 0.6, which means that higher
transmit power (60% (ζ = 0.6) of S’s total transmit power allotted for secret information
(i.e., εPs)) is allocated for relaying primary information while lower transmit power is for
sending secondary information (only 40% (1− ζ = 0.4) of S’s total transmit power allotted
for secret information).
γ
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Figure 3. SOPs w.r.t γ
Figure 3 plots the SOPs w.r.t γ with parameters of Figure 2 excepting Pt/N0 = 10
dB. It is seen that the secondary network is more secured with increasing γ. This can be
explained as follows. Increasing γ offers S more harvested energy but lower receive power for
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decoding primary information. Therefore, the probability of decoding successfully primary
information at S is reduced and hence, secondary information is sent with higher power in
the stage 2, intimately reducing SOPs. Nonetheless, the primary network can obtain the
best security performance with appropriate selection of γ which aims to balance between
harvested energy and probability of decoding successfully primary information at S; for
example, SOPp is minimum at γ = 0.83 as seen in Figure 3. Furthermore, the best security
capability of the primary network is superior to the security performance of the secondary
network owing to ζ = 0.6 as explained from Figure 2.
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Figure 4. SOPs w.r.t ζ
Figure 4 illustrates the SOPs w.r.t ζ with parameters of Figure 2 excepting Pt/N0 = 10
dB. The results show that the primary network is more secured (i.e., SOPp reduces) with
increasing ζ while security trend is reversed for the secondary network (i.e., SOPs increases).
This makes sense because ζ and 1− ζ are proportional to S’s power allotted for primary and
secondary information, correspondingly. Accordingly, increasing ζ reduces SOPp but increa-
ses SOPs. Because of the opposite security tendency of the primary and secondary networks
w.r.t ζ, it is possible to balance the security performance of these networks with appropriate
selection of ζ; for example, SOPp = SOPs when ζ = 0.44 as seen in Figure 4. Furthermore,
due to insufficient power, both secondary and primary networks suffer a complete outage in
a certain range of ζ; for example, SOPs = 1 and SOPp = 1 when ζ ≥ 0.77 and ζ ≤ 0.24,
respectively.
Figure 5 demonstrates the SOPs w.r.t Ct with parameters of Figure 2 excepting Pt/N0 =
10 dB. It is seen that increasing Ct improves the security performance of the secondary
network but degrades that of the primary network. This is attributed from the fact that
increasing Ct (i.e., increasing the target spectral efficiency required by T ) mitigates the
possibility of decoding successfully primary information at S, eventually reducing the chance
that primary information is relayed by S and hence, increasing the SOPp. However, reducing
the chance that primary information is relayed by S increases the possibility that secondary
information is transmitted with higher power and hence, reducing the SOPs. Because of
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Figure 5. SOPs w.r.t Ct
the opposite security performance tendency of the primary and secondary networks w.r.t
Ct, their security capability can be balanced with appropriate selection of Ct; for example,
SOPp = SOPs when Ct = 0.85 bps/Hz as seen in Figure 5.
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Figure 6. SOPs w.r.t ε. The label “varepsilon” on the x axis is ε
Figure 6 shows the SOPs w.r.t ε with parameters of Figure 2 excepting Pt/N0 = 10
dB. This figure demonstrates that the security performance of both primary and secondary
networks can be maximized (i.e., SOPs are minimum) with optimal selection of ε (e.g.,
εopt = 0.33 results in minimum SOPs and SOPp in Figure 6). This εopt is to balance
transmit powers for secret (primary and secondary) information and jamming information.
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Additionally, SOPp is smaller than SOPs. This can be explained on basis of ζ = 0.6 as
Figure 2.
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Figure 7. SOPs w.r.t β
Figure 7 shows the SOPs w.r.t β with parameters of Figure 2 excepting Pt/N0 = 10
dB. This figure illustrates that optimum security performance of the primary and secondary
networks is achievable with optimum selection of β; for instance, SOPs and SOPp are mi-
nimum at β = 0.44 and β = 0.65, correspondingly. The optimal values of β for maximum
security capability can be interpreted as follows. Increasing β helps S harvest more energy
from T and decode successfully primary information with a higher probability in the stage 1;
hence, increasing SINRs in the stage 2. Nonetheless, this increment also decreases channel
capacities in the stage 2 because they are proportional to 1 − β. Therefore, the optimum
values of β is to balance benefits in both stages. Furthermore, the security capability of
primary network is superior to that of the secondary network. This can be interpreted on
basis of ζ = 0.6 as Figure 2. Furthermore, both secondary and primary networks suffer a
complete outage in a certain range of β due to insufficient secrecy capacity; for example,
SOPs = 1 and SOPp = 1 when β ≥ 0.65 and β ≥ 0.83, respectively.
It is recalled that µ is the power splitting factor for secondary and jamming signals when
S fails to decode primary information. Accordingly, to observe the impact of µ clearly, it is
good to consider the scenario where S fails to decode primary information. This scenario
can be established by choosing a large value of Ct. Figure 8 illustrates the SOPs w.r.t µ,
with parameters of Figure 2 excepting Pt/N0 = 10 dB and Ct = 6 bps/Hz. It is seen that
the primary network suffers a complete outage because the large Ct induces S to decode
unsuccessfully primary information all the time and thus, R never receives it for decoding.
Moreover, the secondary network can achieve the best security performance with optimum
selection of µ, which is to balance power allocation for secondary and jamming signals; for
instance, µ = 0.25 maximizes the security performance of the secondary network.
Figure 9 illustrates the SOPs w.r.t C0 with parameters of Figure 2 excepting Pt/N0 = 10
dB. It is seen that both primary and secondary networks are less secured with increasing C0
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Figure 8. SOPs w.r.t µ
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Figure 9. SOPs w.r.t C0
and suffer a complete outage at large values of C0 (e.g., SOPs = 1 and SOPp = 1 when C0
is larger than 0.17 bps/Hz and 0.35 bps/Hz, respectively). Moreover, the primary network
is more secured than the secondary network. This can be explained on basis of ζ = 0.6 as
Figure 2.
It is noted that locating users in cognitive radio networks affects not only benefits (har-
vested energy and probability of recovering correctly primary information) in the stage 1
but also secrecy capacities in the stage 2, intimately varying the SOPs. Figure 10 illustrates
the SOPs w.r.t S’s location with parameters of Figure 2 excepting Pt/N0 = 10 dB. It is
seen that the primary network is less secured with increasing d (i.e., S is far away from T
but closer to (R, D, E)). This makes sense because of reduction in benefits in the stage
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Figure 10. SOPs w.r.t d
1. Nonetheless, the primary network can achieve the best security performance at optimum
location of S which balances benefits in both stages; for example, d = 0.18 results in mimi-
mum SOPp. For the secondary network, its security capability is improved with increasing
d. This can be explained as follows. Increasing d (i.e., primary information is hardly relayed
by S) induces most harvested energy allocated for secondary information with low path-loss
to corresponding receivers. Accordingly, secondary secrecy capacity increases, eventually mi-
tigating SOPs. Furthermore, opposite security performance trend of secondary and primary
networks with d exposes their performance compromise, which is flexibly set-up by choosing
appropriate location of S.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated cognitive radio networks where secondary users operate in the
overlay mechanism and are capable of self-powering to improve energy efficiency and jam-
ming to enhance security performance. Exact secrecy outage probability expressions for
both secondary and primary networks were proposed to analyze their security performance
in various key specifications. Interestingly, based on these proposed expressions, security
capability of both secondary and primary networks can be optimized with appropriate pa-
rameter selection through exhaustive searches. Moreover, their security capability as well
as their performance trade-off can be flexibly adjusted by numerous specifications (power
allocation factor, time allocation factor, power splitting factor,...).
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF ∆
Because Xsr and Xse are statistically independent, ∆ in (25) is computed as
∆ =
∫∫
x<Uy
fXsr (x) fXse (y) dxdy. (70)
Since fXsr (x) is non-zero for x ∈ [1,Ksr), three cases on Uy in correlation to [1,Ksr) are
considered as
∆ =
∫∫
x<Uy
fXsr (x) fXse (y) dxdy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 1: Uy<1
+
∫∫
x<Uy
fXsr (x) fXse (y) dxdy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 2: 1≤Uy<Ksr
+
∫∫
x<Ksr
fXsr (x) fXse (y) dxdy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 3: Uy>Ksr
.
(71)
Because fXse (y) is non-zero for y ∈ [1,Kse) and “Case 1” means y < U−1 < 1, fXse (y) =
0 in “Case 1” and thus, the first term in (71) is zero. Additionally, “Case 2” and “Case 3”
are correspondingly equivalent to U−1 ≤ y < V and y > V where V is defined in (46).
Because fXse (y) is non-zero for y ∈ [1,Kse), three scenarios on V in correlation to [1,Kse)
are considered as follows.
Scenario 1. Kse < V
This scenario reduces the last term is (71) to
∞∫
y=V
 Ksr∫
x=1
fXsr (x) dx
 fXse (y) dy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 3: y>V
, which is
zero because fXse (y) = 0 when y = V > Kse. Accordingly, (71) is simplified as
∆ =
Kse∫
y=1
 Uy∫
x=1
fXsr (x) dx
 fXse (y) dy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 2: U−1≤y<V
. (72)
Invoking (42) to solve the inner integral in (72), one has
∆ =
Kse∫
1
A (1, Uy, Lsr) fXse (y) dy
=
Kse∫
1
eHsr
(
e
Msr
1−Ksr − e MsrUy−Ksr
)
fXse (y) dy
= 1− eHsrB,
(73)
where
B =
Kse∫
1
e
Msr
Uy−Ksr fXse (y) dy. (74)
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It should be noted that the last equality in (73) holds because
Kse∫
1
fXse (y) dy = 1. Plug-
ging fXse (y) in (32) into (74) and after some simplifications, one have
B = MseeHseG, (75)
where
G =
Kse∫
1
e
J
y−V +
Mse
y−Kse
(y −Kse)2
dy, (76)
with J being given in (47).
Substituting (75) into (73), it is seen that ∆ in (73) agrees ∆ in (45) for Kse < V .
Accordingly, the next step is to show that (76) matches (49). Towards this end, executing
some appropriate variable changes, one simplifies (76) to
G
x= 1
y−Kse= −
−∞∫
1/(1−Kse)
e
J
Kse−V+1/x+Msexdx
y=−x
=
∞∫
1/(Kse−1)
e
J
Kse−V
y
y−1/(Kse−V )−Mseydy (77)
= e
J
Kse−V
∞∫
1/(Kse−1)
e
J/(Kse−V )2
y−1/(Kse−V )−Mseydy.
Executing the series expansion ex =
∞∑
n=0
xn
n! for the term e
J/(Kse−V )2
y−1/(Kse−V ) in (77) results in
G = e JKse−V
∞∫
1/(Kse−1)
e−Msey
( ∞∑
n=0
1
n!
[
J/(Kse − V )2
y − 1/ (Kse − V )
]n)
dy
= e
J
Kse−V
∞∑
n=0
Jn
(Kse − V )2nn!
∞∫
1/(Kse−1)
e−Msey
[y − 1/ (Kse − V )]ndy
= e
J
Kse−V

∞∫
1/(Kse−1)
e−Mseydy +
J
(Kse − V )2
∞∫
1/(Kse−1)
e−Msey
y + 1/ (V −Kse)dy
+
∞∑
n=2
Jn
(Kse − V )2nn!
∞∫
1/(Kse−1)
e−Msey
[y + 1/ (V −Kse)]ndy
 .
(78)
Three integrals in the last equality of (78) are solved as follows. The first one is easy
to solve. Additionally, the second one is solved in terms of the exponential-integral function
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while the third one is computed by invoking [44, eq. (3.353.1)]. Plugging the closed forms of
these three integrals into (78), one reduces (78) to (49), finishing the proof of ∆ for Kse < V .
Scenario 2. 1 ≤ V < Kse
This scenario simplifies (71) as
∆ =
V∫
y=U−1
 Uy∫
x=1
fXsr (x) dx
 fXse (y) dy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 2: U−1≤y<V
+
Kse∫
y=V
 Ksr∫
x=1
fXsr (x) dx
 fXse (y) dy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 3: y>V
. (79)
Before solving (79), it should be noted that fXsr (x) is non-zero for x ∈ [1,Ksr) and thus,
Ksr∫
1
fXsr (x) dx = 1. Moreover,
Uy∫
1
fXsr (x) dx is solved as A (1, Uy, Lsr) according to (42).
Accordingly, (79) is simplified as
∆ =
V∫
1
A (1, Uy, Lsr) fXse (y) dy +
Kse∫
V
fXse (y) dy
=
V∫
1
eHsr
(
e
Msr
1−Ksr − e MsrUy−Ksr
)
fXse (y) dy +
Kse∫
V
fXse (y) dy
=
V∫
1
fXse (y) dy − eHsrD +
Kse∫
V
fXse (y) dy
= 1− eHsrD,
(80)
where
D =
V∫
1
e
Msr
Uy−Ksr fXse (y) dy. (81)
It should be noted that the last equality in (80) is solved since
Kse∫
1
fXse (y) dy = 1.
Plugging fXse (y) in (32) into (81) and after some simplifications, one reduces (81) to
D = MseeHseK, (82)
where
K =
V∫
1
eJ/(y−V )+Mse/(y−Kse)
(y −Kse)2
dy. (83)
Inserting (82) into (80), one reduces (80) to (45) for 1 ≤ V < Kse. Accordingly, the
next step is to show that (83) coincides (50). Towards this end, applying some appropriate
variable changes and the series expansion (similarly to steps in (77) and (78)), one reduces
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(83) to
K = e J−MseKse−V
∞∑
n=0
Jn
(Kse − V )2nn!
0∫
I
e−Msex
xn
dx
= e
J−Mse
Kse−V

0∫
I
e−Msexdx+
∞∑
n=1
Jn
(Kse − V )2nn!
0∫
I
e−Msex
xn
dx
 ,
(84)
where I is given in (48).
The first integral in (84) is easily solved while the second one is solved by invoking [44, eq.
(2.324.2)]. Inserting closed forms of these two integrals into (84), one reduces (84) to (50),
completing the proof of ∆ for 1 ≤ Kse < V .
Scenario 3. V < 1
This scenario simplifies (71) as
∆ =
V∫
y=U−1
 Uy∫
x=1
fXsr (x) dx
 fXse (y) dy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 2: U−1≤y<V
+
Kse∫
y=1
 Ksr∫
x=1
fXsr (x) dx
 fXse (y) dy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 3: y>V
. (85)
Since fXse (y) = 0 when y = V < 1, the first term in (85) is zero. Additionally, fXsr (x)
is non-zero for x ∈ [1,Ksr) and fXse (y) is non-zero for y ∈ [1,Kse) and thus, the second
term in (85) is one. Plugging these results into (85), one infers ∆ = 1, which matches (45)
for V < 1. This finishes the proof of ∆ for V < 1.
By combining the three above scenarios, it is seen that ∆ is precisely solved as (45). This
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF Ψ2
Let Xsd = 1 + A¯hsd and X¯se = 1 +
B¯hse
C¯hse+κe
where A¯, B¯, and C¯ are given in (60), (61),
and (62), correspondingly. Relied on the variable change, the PDF of Xsd is expressed as
fXsd (x) =
1
ϑsdA¯
e
− x−1
ϑsdA¯ , x ≥ 1. (86)
Also, by invoking Lemma 1, the PDF of X¯se can be obtained as
fX¯se (y) = G¯
e
E¯ y−1
y−D¯(
y − D¯)2 , 1 ≤ y < D¯, (87)
where D¯, E¯, and G¯ are correspondingly given in (63), (64), and (65).
Invoking (11) and (13) for the case of Γs < Γt, one rewrites Ψ2 in (56) as
Ψ2 = Pr
{
1 +
µPshsd
κd
< U
(
1 +
µPshse
(1− µ)Pshse + κe
)∣∣∣∣Γs < Γt} , (88)
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which is also represented in terms of Xsd and X¯se as
Ψ2 = Pr
{
Xsd < UX¯se
∣∣Γs < Γt} . (89)
Since Xsd and X¯se are statistically independent, (89) can be rewritten in terms of the
individual PDFs of Xsd and X¯se as
Ψ2 =
∫∫
x<Uy
fXsd (x) fX¯se (y) dxdy. (90)
Because fXsd (x) is non-zero for x ≥ 1, two cases on Uy in correlation to 1 are considered
as
Ψ2 =
∫
y<U−1
 ∫
x<Uy
fXsd (x) dx
 fX¯se (y) dy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 1: Uy<1
+
D¯∫
y=1
 Uy∫
x=1
fXsd (x) dx
 fX¯se (y) dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
Case 2: Uy>1
. (91)
The first term in (91) is zero since
∫
x<Uy
fXsd (x) dx = 0 due to fXsd (x) = 0 for x = Uy <
1. Accordingly, by substituting (86) into the second term in (91) and after solving the inner
integral in (91), one has
Ψ2 =
D¯∫
1
(
1− e−
Uy−1
ϑsdA¯
)
fX¯se (y) dy =
D¯∫
1
fX¯se (y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
−e
1
ϑsdA¯
D¯∫
1
e−Q¯yfX¯se (y) dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
, (92)
where Q¯ is given in (66).
The first integral in the last equality of (92) is one due to the property of the PDF while
the second integral can be rewritten after invoking fX¯se (y) in (87) as
H =
D¯∫
1
e−Q¯yG¯
e
E¯ y−1
y−D¯(
y − D¯)2dy
x= 1
y−D¯
= −G¯eE¯−Q¯D¯
−∞∫
1/(1−D¯)
eG¯x−
Q¯
x dx (93)
y=−x
= G¯eE¯−Q¯D¯
∞∫
1/(D¯−1)
e
−G¯y+ Q¯
y dy.
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Executing the series expansion ex =
∞∑
n=0
xn
n! for the term e
Q¯
y in (93), one obtains
H = G¯eE¯−Q¯D¯
∞∫
1/(D¯−1)
e−G¯y
( ∞∑
n=0
1
n!
[
Q¯
y
]n)
dy
x=G¯y
= eE¯−Q¯D¯
∞∑
n=0
(
Q¯G¯
)n
n!
∞∫
E¯
e−x
xn
dx. (94)
The last integral in (94) is solved by invoking [44, eq. (3.381.6)], which reduces (94) to
H = eE¯−Q¯D¯
∞∑
n=0
(
Q¯G¯
)n
n!
E¯−n/2e−E¯/2W−n
2
, 1−n
2
(
E¯
)
. (95)
Substituting (95) into (92), one reduces (92) to (59), finishing the proof.
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